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Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions 
source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about 
epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source 
of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either 
too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully clear conception about new meta-
knowledge obtained by thought experimenting. I compare some interpretations of this position and present 
reasons for favorizing one of them. Conceptualism considers thought experiments as instruments for cleaning 
our conceptual systems. I argue that this position is in fact not about epistemic value of thought experiments, 
but about one specific usage of experimental result. 
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I define thought experiment as a set of instruction that tells us what to imagine with aim to 
get to know something (Picha 2011, 22): the contemplation of thought experiment leads to 
an explicit acceptance of proposition. The principal epistemological question is whether the 
belief obtained this way may be taken as justified. Do we have a reason to take this belief as 
true?  
 
Imagination, which is the core of thought experimentation, is a confusing process influenced 
by individual history, dispositions, opinions, temperament and preferences. Generalizations 
are extremely difficult because of the subjective nature of imagination. However, despite all 
the doubts about thought experiments we still use them, we pay attention to them and 
sometimes we are even convinced by them. Researchers quite dramatically diverge in 
opinion whether we should let thought experiments convince us. On one hand we find 
optimists who understand thought experiments as a solid source of justification. There is 
nothing wrong with the use of thought experiments in the search for truth, and if we are 
sufficiently careful experimenters, we can obtain new knowledge in this way. On the other 
hand, there are skeptics who deny any epistemic value of thought experiments: Imagination 
is misleading and cannot serve as a source of justification. Thought experiments can be used 
only as didactic tools; their epistemic value is zero. 
 
The following paper introduces three optimistic positions: apriorism which understands 
thought experiments as unique source of knowledge about actual world; psychologism, 
according to which thought experiments show something new about our beliefs; and 
conceptualism that attributes to thought experiments a significant role in the elaboration of 
our conceptual equipment. 
Brown’s apriorism 
Let’s start with a non-empirical conception. Its proponent John Brown argues that some 
thought experiments can convey information about our physical world which has not been 
obtained by empirical way or derived in the logical sense from information already known. In 
this sense, some thought experiments are the source of synthetic a priori knowledge (Brown 
1991, 76). Brown's concept of thought experiments is en bloc Platonist. It is a combination of 
epistemological claims about the way thought experiments produce beliefs (apriorism), and 
metaphysical claims about the status of objects and relationships related to these beliefs 
(realism of ideas). Platonism assumes a special non-sensorial epistemic channel leading to 
objective, independent, abstract objects, which provides new synthetic information about 
the world. Some thought experiments therefore do not merely transform beliefs obtained 
through epistemically conventional channels; they are rather “armchair drills” which can 
excavate a new way to universals founding natural laws. Thought experiments are reliable 
because they provide information from ideal domain.  
 
What are Brown’s arguments to justify his conception? At first, he tries to diminish its 
extraordinary character by showing that Platonism in mathematics is regarded as legitimate 
and acceptable. This argument is certainly not strong enough to fully support Brown’s 
statement about thought experiments; however, his objective is mainly to reduce reader’s 
resistance to his conception, because of the authority of mathematics and mathematicians.  
His second argument is more interesting and requires a larger explanation. Basically, it 
means to identify certain group of thought experiments whose functioning cannot be 
explained by empiricism. 
Taxonomy 
There are many ways to sort out thought experiments; Brown proposes taxonomy based on 
three criteria. First, he considers, in accordance with Popper (1959, 521), destructive and 
constructive thought experiments. Destructive experiments mean to criticize a theory, while 
constructive experiments serve to support it. – Secondly, constructive thought experiments 
can be divided according to the character of imaginary situation. How can we understand 
that? Brown describes the principle of thought experimenting as the “establishing a 
phenomenon”, i.e. obtaining the very result of experiment. Brown then distinguishes 
between thought experiments with a surprising result (i.e. established phenomenon) that 
requires further explanation, and thought experiments with a non-problematic result that 
does not require any further explanation. – Thirdly, Brown asks whether the criticized or 
supported theory is formulated before the experimentation, or if the explicit formulation of 
the theory is an outcome of thought experimenting. So there are three criteria – relation to a 
theory, problematic character of result, status of a theory – used by Brown to identify 
destructive thought experiments, as well as three types of constructive thought 
experiments: mediating, conjectural and direct. 
 
 Theory before experiment  Theory after experiment 
Problematic result  conjectural 
Non-problematic result mediating direct 
 
Brown’s typology of constructive thought experiments  
 
Mediating thought experiments are basically didactical tools. Their aim is to make difficult 
theories accessible by the means of a non-problematic phenomenon. Brown shows that 
mediating thought experiments can function as illustrations of non-intuitive outputs or as 
diagrams which help to understand formal aspects of theories, ex. Maxwell’s Demon. – 
Conjectural thought experiments establish a problematic phenomenon which requires a new 
theory. Conjectural experiments are easier to refuse by criticizing that the phenomenon 
established by the experiment would not actually occur, i.e. that the experimental output is 
false. – Direct thought experiments combine non-problematic character of mediating 
thought experiment with the epistemic value of conjectural experiments. They are based on 
establishing of a generally acceptable phenomenon which leads to the formulation of a new 
theory capable to explain the phenomenon.1  
 
From a perspective of epistemic value, the platonic thought experiments are the most 
important category of Brown’s taxonomy. They are scenarios with both destructive and 
constructive role: they criticize one theory to replace it by another one. Platonic thought 
experiments combine the ability to defeat a theory with the constructive qualities of direct 
thought experiments and their non-problematic phenomenon. A platonic thought 
experiment – a typical example is Galileo’s Pisa Experiment – simply refuse one theory to 
replace it with a new, better one. 
 
What is the relation between presented taxonomy and evaluation of epistemic value of 
thought experiments? We have to turn to platonic experiments used by Brown to support 
his apriorism – they produce, according to Brown, a new synthetic knowledge a priori. 
Brown supports his argument by a reconstruction of Pisa Experiment to show more precisely 
when we acquire an a priori knowledge about natural laws of actual world. Contemplating 
Pisa Experiment is supposed to produce knowledge that cannot be deduced from already 
known information.2  
Objections against apriorism 
Why have thought experiments an epistemic value? It seems that the answer of the 
aprioristic conception is brutally simple: because they are a priori.  I argue that such answer 
is insufficient and based on a trick. Apriorism alone is a conception dealing with the 
acquisition of knowledge only, not with the justification of knowledge. The trick lies in the 
fact that traditional epistemological conceptions treat a priori beliefs as analytical truths. If 
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 For an example of conjectural and direct thought experiment see Brown (1991, 3-10). 
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 For the detailed critique of Brown’s reconstruction of Pisa Experiment see Picha (2011, 91-124). 
something is a priori, then it is necessary and true. In such conceptions a priori is not only a 
way we acquire belief, but also a reason why the belief is true. However, in the context of 
Brown’s theory, we have an apriorism that does not deal with analytical truths. It is only a 
description of acquisition of beliefs – those beliefs which cannot be explained by an a 
posteriori way – but there is nothing that justifies truth of these beliefs. Apriorism is rather a 
psychological conception than an epistemic one. 
 
Generally speaking, there are three types of objections against apriorism. First, they 
question whether the epistemic value of thought experiments must be explained by the 
acquisition of new data.  Secondly, they consider the guarantee of truth of a priori beliefs. In 
the particular case of Brown’s version of apriorism, there are doubts whether his Platonist 
assumptions is in accordance with the principle of simplest explanation. The objection is not 
exceptional in the context of thought experiments and appears frequently in general 
discussion on Platonism. Third objection deals with the possibility of mistake in the context 
of apriorism. Nobody doubts that thought experiments can be misleading and produce 
beliefs which are not true. Besides the explanation of reliability of thought experiments, we 
have to explain their fallibility as well. Brown (1991, 92-93) considers the third objection as 
possibly the most important in the philosophy of science; on the other hand he marginalizes 
it by comparison with empirical fallibility. He says that a priori fallibility is not a greater 
problem than the fallibility of our senses. Whether we agree with Brown’s comment or not, 
it is an acknowledgement of weakness that does not appear in other conceptions of 
epistemic value of thought experiments. They do not postulate a specific epistemic channel 
and thus do not need to formulate their own theory of mistake. The objection can be even 
stronger – apriorism is not only too complicated, it is also incomplete. It considers only a 
limited amount of thought experiments (platonic) and does not give account of the rest. We 
should probably admit that mediating experiments are put aside because of the absence of 
epistemic value; let us be generous and assume that epistemic value of direct experiments is 
determined the same way as the platonic experiments. But what are we to think about 
conjectural thought experiments? Should we expect that they lead to new data by the 
means of problematic phenomenon? Shall we consider as epistemically valuable also the 
experiments where our results diverge or change in time? If it is true, then we certainly need 
a theory of fallibility to be able to correct our evaluation. 
Problems of problematic nature 
I have to express as well a critical objection on Brown’s taxonomy, even though it is just a 
tool for a better presentation of apriorism. In long run, any taxonomy needs precisely 
defined criteria. Brown’s taxonomy has the weakness that lies in the vague character of 
criteria, especially the problematicity of phenomenon. Brown explains his conception at two 
places. First, he considers direct thought experiments are based on non-problematic 
phenomena, unlike conjectural experiments (Brown 1991, 41). Secondly, he characterizes 
conjectural thought experiments as the target of objections that doubt phenomena (Brown 
1991, 40). Following the formulations I understand that the non-problematic phenomenon 
established by the experiment is in accordance with our intuitions, which leads to the 
acceptance of the phenomenon. A problematic phenomenon is established by the 
experiments but is not in accordance with our intuitions. 
 
Troubles with this conception of problematicity lie in the way we form our relevant 
intuitions about hypothetical phenomena. More precisely, I find problematicity of 
phenomenon as an individually, historically and culturally based evaluation which can be 
hardly generalized; ex. a problematic phenomenon in Renaissance would not be considered 
as problematic five centuries later (for instance, seven billion people on Earth, instant 
communication in long distances, microsurgeries etc.) The same objection applies in the case 
of experimenters who differ culturally, socially or by acquired education. Let me be clear, I 
do not hold that it is impossible to obtain generalizations about our intuitions which could 
be used to categorize experiments. It is certainly possible to conduct a research of opinions 
on problematicity of hypothetical phenomenon, and divide thought experiments in two 
groups: experiments with rather problematic phenomena and experiments with rather 
intuitively acceptable phenomena. I only think that the proposed categorization of thought 
experiment is relative to various externalities and may change. A conjectural experiment for 
us can very well be a direct experiment for our children. 
 
Let me add a final remark. Maybe we should understand non-problematicity of phenomenon 
in a different meaning. Maybe Brown wants to differentiate phenomena by the acceptance 
or non-acceptance of theory which could adequately explain the phenomenon. Problematic 
phenomenon would be established and intuitive, nevertheless still unexplained by current 
theory. Problematicity would be defined in relation to accepted theory, not intuitions. If 
Brown really means this conception of problematicity, then his division between conjectural 
and direct experiments does not make good sense. In the two categories, the theory is built 
after the thought experiment and phenomena in both categories should thus be taken as 
problematic. However, Brown explicitly states that direct thought experiments establish 
non-problematic phenomena. This interpretation of problematicity cannot be plausible then. 
 
Apriorism is a daring conception that is not afraid of radical epistemological and 
metaphysical additives. This could be applied to show that the debate about epistemic value 
of thought experiments is far from being marginal. If a reasonable person is willing to accept 
robust epistemological and metaphysical premises to explain thought experiments, it is 
probably a topic which deserves our attention. Other optimistic conceptions do not share 
this radicalism. They try to explain epistemic value of thought experiment in accordance with 
the assumption that synthetic knowledge about world can be obtained a posteriori only. In 
this respect, the most influential conception is the theory by Ernst Mach. 
Mach’s psychologism 
According to Mach (1960, 27-28), thought experiments are credible because they are based 
on usual and generally accepted source of justification – perception. In contrast to apriorism, 
the aim is not to create a new epistemic channel, but to use an old one in a new way. Mach 
assumes the existence of “instinctive knowledge” – perceptively, even though unconsciously 
justified beliefs3. Thought experiments serve to pull instinctive knowledge out of the dark 
parts of our mind to the bright place in our attention. While performing thought experiment 
we realize that we already have certain primary, perceptually justified belief. From 
psychological point of view, imagination is the source of new belief – meta-belief that does 
not concern the world but our beliefs themselves. Now we have to ask an epistemological 
question: primary belief is justified perceptually, what is the justification of the meta-belief? 
The answer is straightforward: the source of justification of meta-belief is the same as in the 
case of beliefs about our other mental states – introspection. From this point of view, 
thought experiments are the instruments of introspection which make our hidden non-
reflected beliefs explicit. We can see it analogical to the process of filling a room with fog to 
be able to observe the traces of microparticles. Fog is the analog of imaginary situation 
which creates environment suitable for explicit disclosure of objects or beliefs that have not 
been observed before.  
 
Mach is not specific about his conception, so it is not possible to have a precise idea about 
the character of mental processes that could lead to disclosure of non-reflected beliefs. 
Sorensen (1992, 88) describes several ways how to “improve the epistemic status of thinker 
without the addition of new information”. Three processes are worth to be mentioned: 
remembering, transformation and rearrangement. 
 
Remembering means to recall old information thanks to imagination; it is a change of 
dispositional belief into occurrent one. Sorensen connects this conception with Mach’s 
conception of thought experiment, but I consider the connection as superficial. It is generally 
acknowledged that in order to talk about remembering, a memory must have been 
occurrent belief before. For example, in order to recall now the lunch you had yesterday, 
you would have to be aware of what you were eating during your lunch. Mach’s conception 
of explication of beliefs does not count with such conditions. Thanks to thought experiments 
we can now become aware of belief which was never occurrent.  
 
Is not this conception of remembering past occurrent beliefs only too narrow? Let us count 
as remembering also the recalling of perceptual information we were never aware of before. 
For example, in a state of hypnosis we are able to remember details which have never been 
the content of subject’s occurrent beliefs. Even such broadened notion of remembering does 
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 Externalist has no problem considering instinctive knowledge as knowledge. Internalist prefers to talk about 
justified true proto-belief.  
not correspond to Mach’s conception. According to him, thought experiments can explicate 
even a belief not obtained by perception. This claim obviously raises questions about Mach’s 
epistemology: How is existence of non-perceptual beliefs compatible with his declared 
empiricism? Mach surprisingly combines empiricism with innatism. Some of our beliefs are 
innate and thought experiments are able to disclose them, ex. fear of heights, water and 
foreigners. We have not obtained these beliefs by perception; nevertheless, we can make 
them explicit by thought experimenting. Those explicit beliefs are not memories of non-
conscious perception. At the same time, Mach holds that even the innate beliefs are 
somehow perceptual, because one of our ancestors obtained them by sensory organs. 
Thought experiments thus can explicate beliefs which are perceptual from the point of view 
of subject or his ancestors. However, the explication is not a recalling, because we cannot 
possess someone else’s memories, not even memories of our ancestor. 
 
Transformation is a change of order of old data to the form which is easier to handle. It is a 
change of the relation of belief to surrounding beliefs. Let us have a look at a hidden non-
reflected belief stating that sea is mortally dangerous. The belief is in relation to other, 
reflected beliefs, ex. that there are sharks, medusas and toxins in the sea, that it is 
impossible to breathe in the water and there is a high pressure. Accumulation of these 
reflected beliefs in imaginary scenario leads to the discovery of their inferential connections 
to the non-reflected belief about dangerous sea. I imagine swimming above a mass of water, 
the view of my legs seen from bellow and I realize that such image is not a pleasant one. 
Based on my imagination, I realize that I suffer from belief about mortal danger hidden in 
the sea. Thought experiment turned attention to inferential links between my beliefs and 
made explicit the hidden one.  
 
Rearrangement is a change of ways to treat and keep old data; it is a transformation of 
coding the information. Let us suppose you obtain a following set of beliefs while reading a 
fairy tale: princess is blond, thin, tall, pretty, with a lovely voice, a Mediterranean type, 
probably suffering from anemia and romantic ideas and waiting for her prince. Then you will 
try to use your imagination and create her image before your mind’s eye. You will realize 
that it is not possible to join consistently beliefs about her being blond, tall, thin and 
Mediterranean type. The resulting schism can be described by the fail of attempt to process 
propositional information by the center of visual information. It resulted in the explication of 
belief that princess cannot be tall thin blond and Mediterranean type at the same time. Even 
if the rearrangement can vary, in practice it is always visualization, because imagination is 
almost always powered by images. Of course, there are talented and experienced 
experimenters able to imagine auditory, olfactory, sensational or tactile sensations clearly 
enough to be considered as a basis for thought experiment with tones, smells, meals or 
textile, but generally speaking, human beings rely primarily on visual impressions. In 
comparison with other senses, sight is highly distinctive source of information. A 
transformation model explains thought experiments as visualizations of information 
obtained by epistemically credible ways, which enables to acquire new beliefs on their basis.  
 
I believe only the transformation model is in accordance with Mach’s conception. Why does 
not the rearrangement model correspond to Mach’s view? Simply because Mach supposes 
an existence of primary belief, that is waiting to be discovered. In the dark part of our mind, 
there is a completely made belief; we only need to bring it to the light. The rearrangement, 
however, is not the same – old information is newly treated and lead to the formation of 
brand new beliefs. In the rearrangement model, imagination helps to acquire new primary 
belief, not to obtain meta-beliefs about existing primary belief. It is not, however, important 
which model of transformation suits best to Mach and his conception; the only important 
thing is that there are some plausible empirical explanations of epistemic value of thought 
experiments. 
 
Mach’s conception has been of great influence. Mach proposed a positive answer to the 
question whether thought experimenting may be source of justification. He parts from the 
supposition that thought experiments are not epistemologically unique instruments. They 
are just common ways of thinking utilizing the facts that our minds are not transparent and 
that we can introspect. In this sense Mach can be seen as initiator and defender of “ordinary 
approach” to thought experiments, i.e. the opinion that epistemic value of thought 
experiments can be fully explained by our ordinary cognitive abilities4. Eventual doubt about 
epistemic value of thought experiments is not sui generis; it is doubt about the credibility of 
introspection. 
Kuhn’s conceptualism 
The conceptions mentioned above differ in their opinion about the ways in which thought 
experiments produce new synthetic beliefs. According to Brown, we learn about the actual 
world by learning about the ideal world; according to Mach, we learn about the actual world 
by learning about our beliefs. Kuhn believes that we learn about the actual world by learning 
about our concepts. Kuhn’s approach is divided into two parts: the first one deals with the 
way thought experiments produce new beliefs, the second one shows how new beliefs 
relate to the actual world (Kuhn 1977). 
 
Let us consider the first part. Contradiction is the central notion in Kuhn’s theory. 
Contradiction usually describes a proposition that is always false, or a pair of propositions 
whose conjunction is always false, ex. ‘x is F’ and ‘x is not F’. Contradiction is thus property of 
proposition, or more precisely, of systems of propositions. Sometimes we talk about 
contradictory concept in the sense of contradictio in adjecto when sub-concepts of a 
contradictory concept identify properties impossible to be instantiated together at the same 
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time, ex. ‘round square’. Kuhn thinks that there are many concepts in use that contain 
hidden contradictions. He uses Piaget’s real experiment: when little children were asked to 
show the fastest car out of a group of cars, the children repeatedly chose the car which 
reached the goal as the first one and did not pay attention to the starting point of the cars. 
The children did not consider the distance, only the time needed to reach the end. At the 
same time, the children decided according to other, phenomenal criteria. They describe as 
faster the car that ‘seemed to move faster’ than the other one5. 
 
Kuhn interprets the experiment by stating that children have a contradictory concept of 
‘faster’; and thought experiments are able to discover the hidden conceptual contradictions. 
Let a child imagine a situation in which a car is moving faster according to phenomenal 
criteria. At the same time, the car will reach the end later than the other car that either 
starter first or was closer to the end at the start than the first one. The child will realize that 
under such conditions the car would be faster and slower than the other car at the same 
time, which is absurd. The experimenting child will obtain a new belief about the 
contradictory concept leading to paradox. 
 
Let us consider the second part: How does the new belief about the contradictory concept 
concerns actual world? The contradictory concept ‘faster’ differs from the contradictory 
concept ‘round square’ in the sense that the children’s concept ‘faster’ is not a necessary 
contradiction. The notion ‘round square’ is internally incompatible, while the children’s 
notion ‘faster’ is not – it is possible to imagine a world where all objects move with the same 
speed. In such world, children’s concept ‘faster’ will not be contradictory because 
phenomenal criteria will be useless. The concept ‘faster’ will then simply correspond to the 
concept ‘to finish first’. Kuhn proposes the following: Children’s concept ‘faster’ is not 
necessary contradiction, but only contingent one. The applicability of the concept depends 
on specific natural laws of the possible world. By discovering contingent contradictory 
nature of the concept we realize we do not live in a world with certain natural laws – which 
is new synthetic knowledge. Thought experiment is then a source of knowledge about the 
actual world; it is informative, because by contemplation we realize what does not apply in 
our world. 
 
I find Kuhn’s conception of thought experiments limited, though somehow easier to be 
accepted than some other conceptions. Let me explain my criticism; why is his conception 
limited? Kuhn describes only the argumentative use of imaginary scenarios. He does not say 
how and where we obtain our beliefs, or why we should trust such beliefs. He just tells us 
what to do with such belief. To be specific, Kuhn does not offer an explanation why the 
belief that a car can move phenomenally faster and finish second is justified. – Moreover, 
Kuhn takes in consideration only thought experiments having the form of reductio ad 
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absurdum. Thought experiments show a situation which enables us to see incompatible 
inferential results of an accepted belief, ex. children’s definition of the concept ‘faster’. The 
following structure can be found in some examples only. There are numerous thought 
experiments that cannot be reasonably reconstructed as reductio, ex. Leibniz’s Mill, 
Maxwell’s Demon etc. Kuhn’s conception is not only limited in the sense that it concerns 
broad application of thought experiments; it also deals with just one type of several possible 
applications. 
 
At the same time, Kuhn’s conception is somehow more acceptable. Thought experiments are 
shown as reasonable and perspective tools of scientific research. A great advantage of 
reductio ad absurdum is the fact that it starts with the statements of the opponent. The 
premise is – at least provisory – by both sides considered as accepted starting point. 
Furthermore, Kuhn’s support for the claim that thought experiments concern actual world is 
almost trivial. Why? As I understand Kuhn’s position, he explains thought experimenting as 
evaluation of two arguments. In the first one, we have to imagine certain situation and thus 
derive the metaphysical possibility of such situation. The situation is then used as a 
counterexample to opponent’s statement. To be specific again, we imagine ‘phenomenally 
faster’ car finishing second which serves as a counterexample to the children definition of 
‘faster’. In the second argument, we imagine a possible world w’ where the experimental 
situation cannot occur – and then we derive the contingency of such situation. That is the 
way, according to Kuhn, thought experiments bring information about principles of our 
world. We learn about what does not apply in our world; we realize that w’ is not our world. 
Do we really find out anything new about our world? 
 
The example of car offers two possible – because conceivable – situations. In the first one, 
the cars can move with different speed; in the second one, all cars have to move with the 
same speed. It is the first situation that deals with our world and we know even before the 
experiment that objects move with various speed in our world. Considering experiment we 
just explicitly realize that we do not live in a world where the principle of constant speed 
applies, nothing more. The following example illustrates the triviality of Kuhn’s position. We 
know that the speed of light in vacuum in our world equals to c. We can imagine a world 
with a different speed of light in vacuum. Thanks to that, we realize we do not live in a world 
where the speed of light in vacuum is different than c. Analogically, we know that the 
objects move with various speed in our world. We can imagine a world where it would be 
different. Thus, we realize that the principle of constant speed does not apply in our world.  
 
The thought experiment with cars is an instrument that teaches us two things: first, 
imagined situation with cars is metaphysically possible; secondly, the imagined situation 
with cars is nomologically impossible. Only the first information is obtained by thought 
experiment, i.e. by the use of imagination. The second one is obtained by a banal a priori 
deduction from the knowledge of the actual world. Thought experiment is the source of 
synthetic knowledge just because new conclusions about metaphysical status can be 
combined with our old knowledge of the actual world – and we realize what could apply but 
actually does not. 
 
Kuhn’s conception is in fact not an optimistic conception of epistemic value of thought 
experiments. It is rather an optimistic conception of usefulness of thought experiments in 
science. Kuhn does not say how we reach the results of thought experiments; he says how 
the results are used in scientific argumentation and why they are sometimes useful even for 
scientists. Unlike apriorism or psychologism, conceptualism is only a partial comment on the 
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